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Can Free Speech Be Progressive? 
Louis Michael Seidman* 
Georgetown University Law Center 
  
The answer is no.  At least the answer is no if we are talking about free speech in the American 
context, with all the historical, sociological, and philosophical baggage that comes with the modern, 
American free speech right.   But explaining why the answer is no will require some work. 
I.  Some Clarifications, Caveats, and Throat Clearing 
 I start with two important clarifications. 
First, by “progressivism,” I mean the modern political stance favoring an activist government 
that strives to achieve the public good, including the correction of unjust distributions produced by the 
market and the dismantling of power hierarchies based on traits like race, nationality, gender, class, and 
sexual orientation.1  Although this stance has important points of contact with the progressive 
movement at the beginning of the twentieth century, there are also important differences.2 
Second, saying that the free speech right is not progressive, as so defined, is different from 
denying that it might be an important side constraint on the effort to achieve progressive goals.  Most 
progressives do not favor violence, authoritarianism, or deception even if these techniques might be 
used to advance progressive ends.  Similarly, for all their problems, free speech theories premised on 
                                                          
*  Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  Thanks to 
Brian Leiter, Gary Peller, David Pozen, Geoffrey Stone, and Laura Weinrib for comments on an earlier draft. 
1  For representative defenses, see ROBERT B. REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM:  FOR THE MANY, NOT THE FEW (2016); PAUL 
KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (2007). 
2  Modern progressives have jettisoned some of the faith in expertise as means of transcending social 
conflict and the racism and sexism that marred progressivism’s earlier manifestation.  It is nonetheless true that 
many of the criticisms of the speech right that I advance here have antecedents or roots in earlier versions of 
progressivism.  See generally, David M. Rabbin, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought, 74 TEX. L. REV. 951 
(1996).  For a less sympathetic version that also has fewer points of contact with the argument I advance here, see 
MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH:  THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 78-86 (1991). 
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search for truth,3 development of moral community,4 dignity,5 popular sovereignty,6  intellectual 
humility,7 or tolerance8 might be convincing on their own terms.  I am agnostic about the value of free 
speech as so conceived, but nothing prevents progressives from endorsing the speech right on these or 
other grounds.  That endorsement is fully consistent with the proposition that the answer to the 
question that this essay addresses is “no.” 
Before exploring the reasons why the answer is no, we need to dispose of some obvious reasons 
why someone might think that the answer has to be “yes.”   This someone might say that we don’t need 
to speculate about whether free speech can be progressive.  It has been progressive.  The first 
amendment prevented suppression of labor picketing in the 1930’s and 1940’s9 and suppression of civil 
rights demonstrations in the 1960’s.10  It protected the New York Times when it published an 
advertisement defending Martin Luther King, Jr.,11 and when it published a report discrediting the 
Vietnam War.12  Constitutional protection for freedom of speech shielded antiwar protesters who 
wanted to “fuck the draft,”13 artists who challenged conventional morality,14 and school children who 
resisted compelled, “patriotic” indoctrination.15  What’s not progressive about that? 
                                                          
3  See, e.g, JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 88 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) 
(1859); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
4  See SEANA SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS:  ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW (2014). 
5  See, e.g., David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law:  Toward a Moral Theory of the First 
Amendment,  123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974). 
6  See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). 
7  See, e.g.,  Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character:  From Milton to Brandeis to the Present,  in LEE 
BOLLINGER & GEOFFREY STONE, ETERNAL VIGILANCE:  FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA (2002). 
8  See LEE BOLLINGER, TOLERANCE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986). 
9  See,e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
10  See,e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
11  See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
12  See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
13  See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
14  See, e.g., A book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 
(1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
15  See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  Cf.  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 US. 503 (1969). 
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 There’s no doubt that the assertion of free speech rights can advance progressive goals in 
particular times and places.    I offer no reasons here why left-wing lawyers should not take advantage of 
speech rights so long as they exist, and nothing I say here is meant to begrudge them their victories.16 
 It might even be true that progressives who weigh the downside risks more strongly than the 
possibilities of upside gains will think that they are better off with a free speech right than without it.  
On the one hand, without the right, some states might outlaw progressive speech on topics like Islam, 
abortion, gay rights, and police abuse.  On the other, it is doubtful that even without the right, 
legislatures would enact measures like serious campaign finance reform that are currently blocked by 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the first amendment. 
 These facts, however, do not make free speech progressive.  The working class might be slightly 
better off because of the few crumbs cast their way by the Trump tax law.  That does not make the law 
redistributive.  Similarly, the fact that free speech protects the left from the most extreme threats to it 
does not make the speech right progressive.  The question that I address here is not whether the speech 
right has instrumental utility in isolated cases or whether it is necessary to minimize extreme downside 
risks. Instead, I address the claim that the amendment has significant upside potential.  Can progressives  
weaponized free speech by tinkering with constitutional doctrine?  Can they convert the first 
amendment from a sporadically effective shield against annihilation to a powerful sword that would 
actually promote progressive goals?17  To answer that question, we need to think hard not just about 
isolated cases, but about the theory behind the right and the right’s basic structure.   
                                                          
16  But cf.  pp xx, infra. 
17  The question might be understood in two slightly different ways.  First, might free speech law be 
reformulated so as to constitutionally mandate aspects of the positive program favored by progressives?  For 
reasons that I explain below, see pp xx, infra, I think that this outcome is very unlikely.  At its core, free speech law 
is much more conducive to constitutionally required libertarianism.   
A second, less ambitious version of the question asks whether free speech law could be reformulated so 
as to promote the flourishing of progressivism, even if it did not directly dictate progressive outcomes.  If the 
question is formulated in this way, the possibilities are arrayed along a continuum, from protection against the 
total annihilation of progressivism at one extreme to establishing the preconditions for a total progressive triumph 
on the other.  I am ready to concede that a speech right might provide some assurance against catastrophic 
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 This formulation, in turn, leads to a second sort of objection to my thesis.  It might be said that I 
am assuming that the structure of and theory behind the speech right is static and inevitable.  In making 
that assumption, the argument goes, I am guilty of false necessitarianism.18   In fact, progressives can 
make free speech into anything they want it to be if only we have the will and skill to do so.  Denying 
that fact exhibits a loss of nerve, an absence of imagination, or both. Even if it is true that conservatives 
have been more successful in defining, using, and justifying the right in the past, that is no argument for 
ceding this ground to them in the future. 
 There is a kernel of truth to this objection.  Of course, progressives can reconcile free speech 
with progressive ideals if they fundamentally redefined free speech.  For that matter, they could also 
effect a reconciliation if they fundamentally redefined progressivism.  In some sense, the meanings 
assigned to words are always arbitrary, so, in principle, the meanings might be changed. 
 If my argument is to have purchase, then, we have to take “free speech” as currently defined by 
American constitutional practice, rather than as we might wish to define it.  Pigs can fly if we define “fly” 
as walking on four legs or “pigs” as small animals with wings.  Still, pigs, as currently defined, just can’t 
get off the ground.  That’s a useful fact to know, and it’s also useful to know that the speech right, as 
currently defined, just can’t be progressive.  If we tried to stipulate a definition for free speech that 
made it progressive, doing so would be no more convincing than a stipulated definition for pigs that 
made them airborne.  
A more sophisticated version of the counterargument requires a more sophisticated response.  
Suppose we stipulate a definition of and justification for “free speech” that matches our current 
conceptions.  Still, it might be argued, the existing definition and justification are sufficiently open 
                                                          
outcomes at one end of the continuum, although, for reasons I discuss below, I think the risk of those outcomes is 
often overstated.  See  p xx, infra.  As one moves toward the other end of the continuum, my skepticism about the 
upside potential for free speech law becomes more intense. 




textured and contradictory that progressives could turn it into a right that benefitted them without 
running afoul of the stipulation.  We have hints of how this might be done in the smattering of free 
speech cases where the Court has conceived of the right as providing a platform for resistance to private 
power.19 
 For a generation, practitioners of Critical Legal Studies have made careers out of doing just this 
kind of work in a wide variety of doctrinal domains.20  Since I’ve done some of it myself, I’m hardly in a 
position to insist that the work can’t be done.  What I want to emphasize here is Mark Tushnet’s recent 
reminder that this legerdemain requires work.21  With sufficient effort and cleverness, one can (always?) 
show that the underlying materials will yield unexpected outcomes without violating the conventional 
forms of legal argument.  Given current background conditions, however, doing so necessitates a great 
deal of effort. 
 Moreover, even with this effort, given current background conditions, outcomes that are 
logically possible will nonetheless seem “off the wall” to the relevant audience.22  With much thought 
and effort, I suppose I could produce a legal argument that the very existence of Fox News violates the 
first amendment. But even if the argument was logically sound and formally consistent with the legal 
materials, it would nonetheless violate free speech “common sense.”  For the very reason that free 
speech doctrine is open textured and contradictory, opponents of the argument will be able to marshal 
legal doctrine supporting the “common sense” outcome.  Moreover, they can do so without much work 
– indeed, without breaking a sweat.  
                                                          
19  Justice Black was responsible for the most eloquent examples.  See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 
(1946); Kovacs v. Cooper, 366 U.S. 77, 103 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting). 
20  For a classic example of the technique, all the more powerful because it supports a familiar conclusion, 
see Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down:  A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 781, 800-02 (1983).   
21  See Mark V. Tushnet, The Coverage/Protection Distinction in the Law of Freedom of Speech – An Essay on  
Meta-Doctrine in Constitutional Law, 25 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1073, 1075-77, 1117-20 (2017). 
22  Cf. Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail To Change) the Constitution:  the Case of the 
New Departure, 39  SUFF. L. REV. 27, 28 (2005). 
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Of course, the qualification “given current background conditions” is important.  If we changed 
the background conditions, then it would require much less work to get to the “right” result, and 
outcomes that currently seem “off the wall” would be “on the wall.”23  The question, then, is which 
projects promise the best results with the least work?  Is it really worth it to do legal summersaults to 
show that the legal material can support progressive ends when, even if we succeed as a matter of pure 
logic, the outcome will be dismissed as violating common sense?  Why not instead work to change the 
background conditions so that the outcome no longer violates common sense? Instead of fighting an 
uphill legal battle, why not put our efforts into changing the cultural and political landscape?    
 A possible response to this objection is that a reformulation of the free speech right might be 
part of a broader strategy to change the cultural and political landscape.  If the reformulation could be 
readily accomplished, this approach might make sense.  But the argument I make below is that it cannot 
be readily accomplished.  The theory, structure, and tradition of American free speech law make it a 
particularly unpromising entry point for a progressive transformation.  Or, at least, so I will argue.  
In the next Part, I briefly explore the historical record, which provides little support for the hope 
that the right can be consistently utilized for progressive purposes.  Although suggestive, history by itself 
does not rigidly foreordain future outcomes.   Part III demonstrates that the history is not contingent or 
accidental, but reflects deep conceptual truths about the free speech right.   
II. The Historical Record 
 Because this ground has already been well trod by others,24 I provide no more than a brief 
sketch here.   
                                                          
23  See, e.g., id. 
24  See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE” (2000);  MARK A. GRABER, 
TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH:  THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991); DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS 
FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:  FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME (2004); LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING 
OF FREE SPEECH:  AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPROMISE (2016); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties Revolution, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Robert F. Nagel, How Useful Is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases,  69 
COLUM. L. REV. 302 (1984). 
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   For roughly the first century and a quarter after the adoption of the first amendment, a 
judicially enforced free speech right barely existed.25  That is not to say that there were no conflicts over 
freedom of speech.  For example, the Alien and Sedition Acts at the end of the eighteenth century26 and 
the suppression of anti-slavery petitions to Congress at the middle of the nineteenth century27 
generated robust debates about free speech.  There were free speech arguments about the Comstock 
Act, which regulated obscene material,28 the Alien Immigration Act of 1903, which excluded aliens who 
advocated anarchism,29 and about local laws that restricted access to streets and parks for public 
protest.30  In all of these instances, free speech arguments advanced causes that we might today identify 
as “progressive.” 
But these arguments mostly fell on deaf ears.  Of course, the historical record is complicated31 
and, here as elsewhere, it is a mistake to confuse judicial enforcement of constitutional rights with the 
rights themselves.  We cannot know how many statutes were not enacted and executive actions not 
undertaken because political actors had internalized free speech norms.  But, as Mark Graber has 
demonstrated, the support there was for free speech was premised on conservative, libertarian ideology 
at war with progressive ideals.32 Moreover, as the preceding paragraph details, there were plenty of 
instances where political actors impinged on what we think of as free speech rights, and, for the most 
part, no court was available to check these invasions. 
                                                          
25  See generally, DAVID RABBIN, note 24, supra.  
26  See GEOFFREY R. STONE, note 24, supra,  at 16-66. 
27  See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, note 24, supra,  at 155-181 
28  See DAVID RABBIN, note 24, supra, at 130. 
29  See id. 
30  See id., at 110-116. 
31  For example, state courts occasionally vindicated free speech claims,  see DAVID M. RABBAN, note 24, supra, 
at 119-20, 175-76 (1997),   or reversed convictions without relying on the First Amendment in situations where it 
seems clear that free speech concerns nonetheless influenced the decision.  See, e.g., LAURA WEINRIB, note 24, supra 
at 111 (2016). 
32  See MARK GRABER, note 24, supra,  at 17-49. 
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For most of the period in question, judges thought that the first amendment was inapplicable on 
the state and local level, where most of the quotidian infringements on speech occurred.  And even 
where the first amendment did apply, the prevailing view was that it prohibited only prior restraints and 
permitted criminal punishment for speech that had already occurred.    As David Rabban summarizes the 
evidence 
Throughout the period from the Civil War to World War I, the overwhelming majority of 
decisions in all jurisdictions rejected free speech claims, often by ignoring their existence.  . . .  
No court was more unsympathetic to freedom of expression than the Supreme Court, which 
rarely produced even a dissenting opinion in a First Amendment case.  Most decisions by lower 
federal courts and state courts were also restrictive.  Radicals fared particularly poorly, but the 
widespread judicial hostility to free speech claims transcended any individual issue or litigant.33  
According to the conventional account, all this changed with the Espionage Act prosecutions 
during World War I, the eloquent opinions by Holmes and Brandeis, and the birth of modern free speech 
doctrine.34  These changes on the Court were accompanied by changes in the underlying rational for 
speech protection from a libertarian theory, in obvious tension with progressive ends, to a theory based 
on democratic engagement that was much more friendly to progressivism.35 
But revisionist accounts, which by now are, themselves, conventional, suggest that there is 
much less here than meets the eye.36  Despite Holmes and Brandeis, the Court affirmed the conviction 
and lengthy sentences of World War I dissenters.37  It was only after the war fever subsided, at a 
moment when speech rights were much less important to radicals, that the Court began reversing 
                                                          
33  DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 131 (1997). 
34  See, e.g.,  LAURA WEINRIB, note 24, supra, at 4-5 (noting conventional accounts). 
35  See MARK A. GRABER, note 24, supra, at 122-164. 
36  See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, note 24, supra, at 192-98;  Michael J. Klarman, note 24, supra at 9.  
37  See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919);  Debs v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
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convictions of individuals jailed because of their speech.38  Decisions during this period were of some aid 
to labor unions39 and to political radicals,40 but many of the cases involved groups like the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses,41 which were in no sense progressive.   
The same pattern repeated itself during the post-World War II red scare.  When free speech 
protection was most needed, it was least available.  The Court acceded to criminal convictions and 
firings of scores of people because of their political affiliations.42  It was only after the panic abated that 
the Court reinvigorated free speech law.43 
During the brief Warren Court interregnum, free speech doctrine provided some real protection 
for progressive causes.  Most notably, Warren Court decisions aided civil rights protestors,44 and 
opponents of the Vietnam War.45  Yet even at high tide, the Warren Court provided only intermittent 
and uncertain protection.  For example, the Court upheld the criminal convictions of draft card 
burners,46 some civil rights demonstrators,47 and publishers of otherwise constitutionally protected 
speech who engaged in what the Court called “pandering.”48  
                                                          
38  See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 
U.S. 242 (1937). 
39  See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940). 
40  See, e.g.,  Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
41  See, e.g.,  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).  For an 
account of the role that Jehovah’s Witnesses played in the development of free speech law and of the way in 
which conservatives used cases involving the Witnesses to attack progressive constitutionalism, see Jeremy K. 
Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism,   116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016). 
42  See,e.g.,  Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); 
Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 580 (1952).   
43  See.e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); 
Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
44  See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).  
45  See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 US. 503 
(1969). 
 
46  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
47  See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
48  Ginzburg v. United States, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
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With the receding of Warren Court liberalism, free speech law took a sharp right turn.  Instead 
of providing a shield for the powerless, the first amendment became a sword used by people at the apex 
of the American hierarchy of power.  Among its victims:  proponents of campaign finance reform,49 
opponents of cigarette addiction,50 the LBGTQ community,51 labor unions,52 animal rights advocates,53 
environmentalists,54 targets of hate speech,55 and abortion providers.56  While striking down laws that 
protected all of these groups, the Court upheld a statute that cut off all funding to colleges and 
universities that refused to allow the military to recruit on campus57 and a statute that criminalized 
purely political speech that constituted neither incitement nor a clear and present danger when the 
speech “materially support[ed]” a group that the State Department labelled as a “foreign terrorist 
organization.”58 
No one should confuse this quick-and-dirty summary with a serious analysis of the history of 
free expression in the United States.  It goes without saying that I have elided many details and 
complications.  But the summary is sufficient to demonstrate that over the course of our history, free 
speech law has only occasionally been of much help to progressive causes and that during the modern 
period, it has been an important impediment. 
Despite this, advocates of free speech progressivism want to claim that the modern period is 
aberrational and that it is possible to return to or create a new golden age during which the speech 
right, properly understood, would mandate progressive outcomes.  They are at least partially right.  
                                                          
49  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Commn., 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
50  See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco C. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
51  See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
52  See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014). 
53  See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
54  See Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commn., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
55  See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
56  See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
57  See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006).  In the interest of full 
disclosure, I note that I served on the Board of Directors of the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights. 
58  See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
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Modern free speech doctrine breaks from the recent past because it has gone beyond authorizing 
political suppression of the left; courts have affirmatively intervened to reverse the left’s occasional 
political victories.59   
In a deeper sense, though, the modern period is far from aberrational.  At its core, free speech 
law entrenches a social view at war with key progressive objectives.  For that reason, it is not surprising 
that throughout American history, the speech right has, at best, provided uncertain protection for the 
left.  The modern, anti-progressive first amendment amounts to the delayed presentation of traits built 
into the genetic material of the speech right.60 
The next Section explores that genetic material. 
III.  Four Reasons Why Free Speech Cannot be Progressive 
A.  Free Speech and Property Entitlements 
There is an intrinsic relationship between the right to speak and the ownership of places and 
things.  Speech must occur somewhere and, under modern conditions, must use some things for 
purposes of amplification.  In any capitalist economy, most of these places and things are privately 
owned, 61  and in our capitalist economy, they are distributed in dramatically inegalitarian fashion.  
                                                          
59  See, e.g., Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WISC. L. REV.133.  But cf.  Jeremy K Kessler, The Early 
Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016) (cautioning against “treating First 
Amendment Lochnerism as a recent corruption of an otherwise progressive project of judicial civil 
libertarianism.”) 
60  See id.   
Many of the arguments I offer below might be extended to attack liberal constitutional rights more 
generally.  There is an extensive literature, some of it with roots in the progressive tradition, that is skeptical of 
rights rhetoric.  See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Rights, in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT 
CRITIQUE (WENDY BROWN & JANET HALLEY, EDS. 2002); Mark V. Tushnet, An Essay on Rights,  62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984); 
Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 464 (1909).  But the argument against rights plays out in 
different ways and with different force in different settings.  In this essay, I confine my discussion to the speech 
right. 
61  Most, but not all.  The right to a public forum provides a partial corrective, but, under modern conditions, 




Even before the recent, radical right turn in free speech law, the connection between property 
and speech posed a problem for a progressive version of the speech right.  Because speech 
opportunities reflect current property distributions, free speech inherently favors people at the top of 
the power hierarchy.   
Consider, for example, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,62 where the Court 
invalidated restrictions on independent corporate campaign speech.  The case is the bete noir of free 
speech progressives, and for obvious reasons.  The holding, and closely related holdings restricting 
regulation of independent political action committees63 and of aggregate contribution limits,64 more or 
less doom the effort to break the chain between money and politics.  That link, in turn makes 
progressive political victories much more difficult and, often, impossible.   
These grim facts should not distract us from the reality that the holding was also more or less 
inevitable.  The case was effectively lost when, at oral argument, the Justices began asking questions 
about media corporations.65  No one thinks that the government can prohibit the Washington Post from 
endorsing a Hillary Clinton for president or Penguin Books from publishing a book during election season 
criticizing Donald Trump.  The government struggled to distinguish media corporations from other 
corporations wishing to spend money on political speech, but the Court proved unwilling to accept the 
distinction, and it is hard to see how it could have been operationalized.   
Suppose, though, that the Court had somehow fashioned a carve-out for media companies.  
Such an exception hardly solves the problem from a progressive point of view.  No progressive should be 
surprised by the fact that that media companies are disproportionately owned by very wealthy people.  
                                                          
62  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
63  See SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commn., 599 F. 3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
64  See McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commn., 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).  
65  See Transcript of Oral Argument in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commn. at 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2008/08-205.pdf pp26-40; Transcript of 
Oral Argument in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commn, at 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2008/08-205[Reargued].pdf, pp 64-68. 
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In every other sphere, progressives reject the idea that markets and willingness to pay necessarily 
produce just distributions of assets.  Why should distribution of media assets be any different?  So long 
as there is a link between wealth and the means of speech amplification, the first amendment cannot be 
progressive.66   
It bears emphasis that this outcome is not the result of conservative distortion of free speech 
theory that might easily be remedied if progressives controlled the Supreme Court.  The immunity of 
newspapers and book publishers from government control is a bedrock free speech principle.  That 
immunity favors people who are wealthy enough to acquire these assets. 
Understanding the connection between property and speech unmasks progressive support for 
the speech right for what it is:  a kind of “trickle down” theory of civil liberties.  Yes, the big victors are 
the rich and powerful, but the rather pathetic hope is that just enough protection will trickle down to 
prevent the government from entirely annihilating the left.  
There is, of course, something to this argument.  The first amendment might protect the left 
from the most serious sorts of attack even if it stands in the way of affirmatively advancing the left’s 
agenda.   The defense nonetheless understates the extent to which the speech game is competitive and 
the extent to which doctrinal manipulation can support politically discriminatory application of legal 
rules.  More importantly, though, it misunderstands the most serious danger to effective progressive 
speech.   
  In the modern era, the danger is not mass imprisonment of leftists.  It is not even milder forms 
of intimidation like blacklists or exclusion from government jobs.  Of course, this state of affairs might, 
                                                          
66  Of course, there is always the possibility that government regulation of media would make things worse 
rather than better.  Both thoroughgoing Marxists and thoroughgoing libertarians believe that this result is 
inevitable, at least under current conditions.  But progressives occupy the uneasy space between Marxists and 
libertarians.  They think that government offers the best hope of regulating market outcomes to make them more 
just.  Giving up that hope is giving up on progressivism itself, and, so long as the hope remains alive, no progressive 
should favor media immunity from government regulation designed to redistribute speech opportunities.    For 
further discussion, see pp xx, infra. 
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itself, be the result of our free speech culture.  If that culture were destroyed, there is some risk that 
these tactics would reappear. But the risk is relatively small because conservatives have come to 
understand that heavy handed repression often backfires and is unnecessary.  Ironically, what works 
much better is the proliferation and splintering of speech opportunities.  These trends are greatly 
enhanced by technological changes in the means of speech production.  As Tim Wu has forcefully 
argued,67 the modern free speech problem is not government suppression, but speech clutter, trolling, 
and speech siloing.  “Fake news” is everywhere, and because views are constantly reinforced by 
exposure to ideologically driven media, there is too little prospect of correction.   
One might suppose that this democratization of speech breaks the link between wealth and 
speech opportunities.  In fact though, the change exacerbates, rather than diminishes, the difficulty for 
progressives.  In a world where there is too much speech, people need a filter.  Anyone can use Twitter 
but that very fact means that Twitter produces an undifferentiated and useless swamp of information 
and opinion.  The real control is therefore exercised not by speech producers, but by speech aggregators 
and amplifiers, who are themselves protected by the first amendment.  While it may be cheap to 
produce speech, aggregation and amplification -- speech management -- still requires capital.  
Moreover, the managers regularly shield speech consumers from ideas that are unfamiliar, upsetting, or 
inconsistent with a preconceived narrative.  To the extent that progressive views are all of these things, 
they are regularly filtered out. 
Deeply engrained first amendment doctrine makes it very difficult to deal with this state of 
affairs. The doctrine is dominated by obsession with government restrictions on speech and with 
government interference with listener autonomy.  It is ill-equipped to deal with a world where there is 
too much speech and where listener autonomy makes real conversation impossible. 
                                                          
67  Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete, at SSRN-id3096337%20(1).pdf. 
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The problem of too much speech also provides reason for skepticism about some of 
progressivism’s favorite solutions to the free speech problem.  Many progressives favor leveling the 
playing field without running afoul of first amendment principles by government subvention of speech.  
Why not give every citizen a campaign contribution voucher to use to support the candidate of her 
choice?  Why not have government sponsored newspapers, web sites, and publishers open to all?  Why 
not greatly expand funding for investigative reporting or the National Endowment for the Arts the 
National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Public Broadcasting Network? 
I don’t want to deny that some of these proposals might make things marginally better.  Still, 
even apart from speech clutter, they have obvious problems and limitations.  Providing campaign 
contribution vouchers adds to the total volume of campaign speech, but it does relatively little to 
remedy the disproportion.68  Government sponsorship of the means by which speech is produced 
introduces inevitable problems about government choices about which speech to subsidize.  But the 
more fundamental difficulty is that in a world where there is already too much speech, and where 
people are shielded from speech they disagree with, government programs to encourage more speech is 
unlikely to make things better and might actually make them worse.   
In theory, many of these problems might be solved by wealth redistribution that made our 
society more egalitarian.  In a world where there was more economic equality, control of speech 
production and management would be more economically diverse. Put differently, if the progressive 
program were already enacted, free speech might be more progressive.  And that, of course, is the 
problem.  The impact of money on politics makes it much harder to assemble legislative majorities to 
enact the progressive program.  Worse yet, the modern right turn in first amendment law demonstrates 
that the speech right has the potential to make redistribution unconstitutional. 
                                                          
68  The problem is made worse by the Court’s insistence that the government may not peg subsidies to the 
amounts spent by a candidate’s opponent.  See  Davis v. Federal Election Commn., 128 S. t. 2759 (2008); Arizona 
free Entgerprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011). 
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To understand this last point, we need to examine the contradiction at the heart of the New 
Deal constitutional settlement.  Beginning with the famous footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene 
Products,69 the Court sought to distinguish between the protection of economic and political rights.  On 
this view, property entitlements were discretionary and subject to redistribution if political majorities 
can be assembled to support redistributive programs.  In contrast, civil liberties, like freedom of speech, 
were fixed and immune from majoritarian erosion.  The contradiction is obvious: because speech rights 
depend upon property entitlements, free speech cannot remain fixed while property entitlements are 
redistributed.   
The tension might be resolved in one of two ways.  First, the discretionary character of property 
rights might bleed over into speech law, thereby making speech opportunities discretionary rather than 
mandatory.  Some examples illustrate how this might be accomplished.  At this writing, the Supreme 
Court seems poised to hold that “agency fees” charged to nonunion members working for public 
employees violate the first amendment.70  Opponents of the fees argue that public employee unions are 
engaged in inherently political activity and that forced payment of the fees that support that activity 
therefore constitutes unconstitutional compelled speech.   
As Benjamin Sachs has pointed out,71 the argument depends on the money in question being 
the property of the employees.  One might instead think of the money as being the property of the state 
employer.  Suppose that instead of deducting the agency fee from the workers’ paychecks, the 
government simply paid its workers lower wages and donated the surplus to the union. No employee 
would be forced to endorse a cause she opposed, so the compelled speech claim would evaporate.  
Because property rights are discretionary, it would seem that there is no constitutional obstacle to this 
recharacterization of the property right.   
                                                          
69  United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n. 4 (1938). 
70  See Janus v. AFSCME (cert. granted, Sept. 28, 2017). 
71  Benjamin I. Sachs, Agency Fees and the First Amendment, ___ HARV. L. REV. ___ (2018) (forthcoming). 
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A similar argument was available in another compelled speech case, Dale v. Boy Scouts of 
America.72  State antidiscrimination law prohibited the Boy Scouts from excluding individuals from the 
organization because of their sexual orientation.  The Boy Scouts claimed that the law violated their 
right to “expressive association” by requiring them to endorse a life style they opposed.  But this 
argument depended on the unstated assumption that the “Boy Scouts” were owned by an organization 
called The Boy Scouts of America.   Suppose, though, that one treated the antidiscrimination statute as 
adjusting this property claim.  Although the Boy Scouts of America retained most of the sticks in the 
bundle, the statute created a kind of nondiscrimination “easement” and vested that property right in 
people like Dale.  If Dale had the entitlement in the first place, then the free speech right cuts the other 
way.  The Boy Scouts would be violating Dale’s speech rights by utilizing his property to advance their 
ideological objectives. 
Of course, Dale lost his case, and public employee unions are likely to lose theirs.  These results 
entail resolving the tension between property and speech entitlements in a second way:  allowing 
speech law to bleed over into property law, thereby making property entitlements fixed rather than 
discretionary.  Just because speech is immune from government redistribution, therefore the property 
rights necessary to support speech must be fixed as well.  If this resolution is chosen, then the state may 
not treat the agency fees as state property, and the state must treat Boy Scout membership decisions as 
belonging to the Boy Scouts of America. 
 In principle, the Court might use this technique to constitutionally entrench a libertarian utopia.  
Because all property has the potential to fund speech, any property redistribution affects speech 
opportunities and, therefore, in some sense gives government control over speech. The Justices have 
not yet gone that far, and are unlikely to do so.   
                                                          
72  530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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Still, when confronted with direct conflict between a fixed first amendment and a fluid property 
regime, the modern Court has often resolved the contradiction by fixing property rights, thereby 
producing what commentators have called “the new Lochnerism.”73  The political branches must simply 
accept the fact that consumer tastes for harmful products are deformed by commercial advertising.74  If 
publishers sell books or newspapers that harm those they defame, the state is often precluded from 
redistributing the economic loss.75  The government is sharply constrained if it tries to intervene in the 
economic market for political candidates.76  It may not regulate a pharmacy’s decision to sell 
confidential information about drug prescriptions77 and is substantially constrained from regulating the 
manner in which merchants state the price for the goods they sell.78 
 Once again, these results do not result from a deformation of the free speech right.  They are 
the consequence of shielding the speech power from political redistribution.  For a period it may have 
seemed that speech rights could be protected from the political branches while subjecting economic 
entitlements to political adjustment.   But because speech opportunity depends upon property 
distributions, this compromise was always doomed to failure.  The Court might have eviscerated the 
speech right by allowing the political branches to manipulate its economic substrate.  In recent years, it 
has chosen instead to invigorate the right by imposing Lochner-like restrictions on the property 
entitlements that make speech possible.  The results have been disastrous for progressives, but the 
disaster is a necessary consequence of taking free speech seriously. 
B.  Free Speech and the Feasance-Nonfeasance Distinction 
                                                          
73  See, e.g., Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WISC. L. REV.133. 
74  See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
75  See, e.g.,  New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
76  See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. ___ (2014). 
77  See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
78  See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
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 Speech causes harm.  It can coerce, humiliate, mislead, embarrass, and destroy.  Of course, the 
suppression of speech also causes harm.  So, as a first cut, the public policy question is how to balance 
the two potential harms against each other. 
 Actually, though, the question is more complicated than this.  For reasons I outline below,79 the 
speech game is often zero sum.  Granting speech opportunities to some often denies speech 
opportunities to others.  For that reason, the speech right harms speech, as well as nonspeech, 
interests.  Solving the policy question therefore requires balancing along two different dimensions:  We 
need to balance between competing speech so as to maximize overall speech opportunities, and then 
we need to balance those speech opportunities against nonspeech costs so as produce the most speech 
at the least cost.   
 Needless to say, operationalizing all this poses a complicated problem.  Conservatives have a 
simple solution to it.  Much of the work is done by presumptively favoring government nonfeasance 
over government feasance.  Government intervention is appropriate when private individuals harm 
others, but the harm must be clearly and narrowly defined.  Absent such harm, the private sphere will 
magically produce optimal outcomes. 
 American free speech law adheres to this approach.  Like the rest of the Constitution, the first 
amendment links freedom to government nonfeasance and oppression to government action.  It 
assumes that speech is “free” when government “makes no laws,” and that it is laws that have the 
potential to “abridge” the freedom of speech.  If homophobic, religious fanatics add to the pain of 
grieving friends and relatives at a military funeral, the mourners have no legal recourse.  But if the 
                                                          
79  See P. xx, infra. 
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government tries to prevent infliction of this harm, the fanatics can invoke judicial process to enforce 
their speech rights.80   
The dichotomy is starker still when speech rights are on both sides of the ledger.  If Facebook 
takes down posts expressing political views it dislikes, that action is a manifestation of freedom, and the 
government’s decision to do nothing about it raises no free speech concerns.  But if the government 
intervenes to force Facebook to provide fair speech opportunities to all, that action is coercive and there 
is at least a first amendment problem and maybe a first amendment violation.81 
 This general orientation violates core progressive commitments.   Progressives think that the 
government has a duty to act affirmatively to counterbalance private power and correct for the 
unfairness of market allocations.  When the government “does nothing” – when it acts like a “night 
watchman state” or endorses laissez faire economics – it is failing to meet its responsibilities. 
 Progressives are not unaware of the risk of government capture.  There is always the possibility 
that government intervention will make things worse rather than better.  Progressives have two 
responses to this risk.  First, they emphasize the “compared to what” problem.  Governments can be 
arbitrary and autocratic, but markets also have problems.  Most progressives favor a mixed system that 
leaves many matters in the private sphere but also provides for more or less government intervention to 
enforce public values. 
Second, many progressives point out that nonintervention is not a real possibility.  Background 
property and contract rules as well as our tax and spending regime, regulation of the money supply, and 
countless other government interventions give particular people the power to control resources.  If the 
rules were different, other people would be in control.  One way or the other, the government is 
                                                          
80  See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
81 Cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).  But cf. Turner Broadcasting System Inc. v. 
FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
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implicated in supposedly private decisions.  Given the inevitability of government involvement, the state 
should be obligated to promote, rather than retard the broad distribution of power and opportunity. 
 How might this general stance toward market allocations be reconciled with free speech law?    
Progressives might treat speech as different from other sorts of entitlements.  They might, in other 
words, argue that a laissez faire state with respect to speech serves progressive interests even as laissez 
faire endangers progressive goals with respect to everything else.  Alternatively, they might try to 
refashion free speech law so as to mandate government action rather than inaction. 
 It is hard to see what sort of argument would support the first resolution.  One might think that 
speech is especially valuable or especially vulnerable to state suppression.  As noted above, one can be a 
progressive and still favor freedom of speech on nonprogressive grounds.  But how does a laissez faire 
speech regime promote progressive ends?  If progressives think that the risk of unfair market allocations 
is less than the risk of plutocratic government, then why don’t they trust government to allocate speech 
opportunities.  If they think that government is inevitably implicated in market decisions, how can the 
government avoid implication in speech decisions?    
Despite these difficulties, a progressive might support free speech if she thought that the 
political branches would most often be controlled by the enemies of progressivism and that the 
maintenance of a constitutionally protected private sphere was necessary to protect progressives from 
these enemies.   
There is something to this argument.  As noted above, it is at least possible that the speech right 
has protected progressives from truly catastrophic outcomes.  But there is a big gap between 
acknowledging this possibility and believing that the speech right could be refashioned so as to actually 
mandate progressive outcomes.   
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Moreover, if we take seriously the argument that the political branches are likely to be 
controlled by the enemies of progressives, we risk impeaching the progressive position more generally.  
If the enemies of progressivism are more likely to win elections, then progressives should also want to 
shield property entitlements from political interference.  A reactionary state that suppresses progressive 
speech will also redistribute property in the wrong direction.  As flawed as markets are, they are better 
than this alternative.  To be clear, the worry about reactionary government may be justified, but if it is, 
then progressivism itself should be rejected.  Free speech would then be reconciled with the progressive 
ideal, but only because the ideal has been transformed beyond recognition.   
The other alternative is to reconceive speech law so as to break the link between freedom and 
government nonfeasance.  As argued above, there is nothing in principle that stands in the way of 
accomplishing this goal, and there are fragile and neglected strands of first amendment doctrine that 
support it.  For example, long ago, the Supreme Court held that the government had an affirmative 
obligation to regulate privately owned “company towns” that were restricting speech.82  But cases like 
this are isolated and aberrational.  We need to understand how deep a transformation would be 
required to turn them into central parts of free speech doctrine. 
The problem becomes apparent as soon as one sees that opening speech opportunities for 
some means limiting speech opportunities for others.  A statute that required best-selling books to 
publish “balanced” accounts of controversial issues impinges on the speech right of authors.  A law that 
requires TV stations to offer “equal time” discourages stations from editorializing.   Equalizing campaign 
expenditures entails reducing the power of the wealthy to communicate their messages. 
All of this would have to be in service of creating some target “fair” distribution of speech 
opportunities.  But what distribution is “fair”?  As currently distributed, flat earthers and advocates for 
                                                          
82  Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
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burning witches have very limited speech opportunities.  Is that really a bad state of affairs?  If overt 
racists are currently underrepresented in our speech market place, should progressives really favor 
government subsidies so they can more effectively get their message out?  The alternative is for the 
government to decide that some distributions are appropriate because the underrepresented speech is 
just “wrong.”  But once the government is given that power, there is no guarantee that it will not put 
progressive speech in the “just wrong” category.   
In any event, a systematic effort by the government to determine which speech to promote and 
which to suppress based on official determinations of the correctness of contested positions is the 
antithesis of the speech right rather than its apotheosis.  Even if it would promote progressive values, it 
would be unrecognizable as a realization of first amendment ideals. 
C.  Free Speech and Government Neutrality 
 The problem posed by government determinations about the appropriate distribution of speech 
opportunities points toward a third obstacle to a progressive speech right.  American speech law is 
dominated by a concern about equality and neutrality.  Free speech law’s core commitment is to the 
proposition that the government may never suppress speech simply because of disagreement with the 
message that it expresses.83  Although the government itself can express controversial opinions,84 only 
the secondary effects of speech can justify government restrictions on the speech of others.85   
                                                          
83  See ,e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the 
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”) 
84  See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (when government engages in its 
own expressive conduct, free speech clause has no application). 
85  See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (justifying “incidental” limits on free speech). 
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Much of the first amendment’s doctrinal apparatus concerning matters like content,86 
viewpoint,87 and speaker88 neutrality reinforce this basic idea.  Because free speech is the means by 
which our political disputes are resolved, our free speech regime must, itself, be neutral as between 
those disputes.  That is why content and viewpoint restrictions are especially suspect and why even 
regulation that only indirectly affects speech must be justified on grounds other than disagreement with 
the views being expressed. 
 This stance, in turn, reflects a broader theoretical view about the overall purpose of 
constitutional law.  On standard liberal premises, the Constitution is supposed to provide the 
mechanism by which people with opposing views can settle their disagreements through law rather 
than power.  To accomplish this goal, the Constitution must be acceptable to people of differing political 
beliefs.  It is designed to enforce a regime of fair political competition, and the competition can be fair 
only if the Constitution is neutral regarding the outcome.89   
 But progressivism is not neutral.  It is a fighting faith committed to a particular and controversial 
outcome.   It follows that a progressive first amendment necessarily violates the ground level premises 
of American constitutionalism.  Reasonable conservatives would be no more bound in conscience to 
accept a progressive first amendment than reasonable progressives would be bound to accept a 
conservative version.  So long as we imagine that the Constitution is the common ground that people of 
all political persuasions can adhere to, it cannot be progressive. 
                                                          
86  See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (holding that content regulation of outdoor signs 
is unconstitutional). 
87  See, e.g. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down “Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance” on 
the ground that it embodied viewpoint discrimination.) 
88  See, e.g., Perry Educators’ Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (upholding 
speaker based restriction in context of nonpublic forum).   
89  Anything like a full defense of this position would far exceed the scope, and mandated word limits, of this 
comment.  For present purposes, it is enough to say that rational individuals are unlikely to commit themselves to 




 A fair response to this argument is that constitutional neutrality is a sham.  As any serious 
student of constitutional history knows, the Framers were interested in producing some outcomes and 
avoiding others.  Living constitutionalists don’t think that we should be bound by the Framers’ views, 
but it is deeply implausible that they are indifferent to the outcomes their interpretations produce.  
More particularly, for reasons I have already detailed, free speech law is hardly neutral.  It systematically 
favors status quo distributions and, so, the rich and powerful.  Indeed, the claim that free speech law is 
“just there” or is fair to everyone is an important part of the mystification that stymies progressive 
programs. If speech law is inevitably going to be biased one way or the other, then why not bias it 
toward progressives? 
 The underlying observation is fair enough, but the conclusion does not follow. If the Constitution 
is not, and cannot be, a fair and neutral framework that everyone is bound to accept, that is a reason for 
abandoning rather than embracing constitutional law.  If progressives are harmed by first amendment 
mystification, then they should favor repealing the amendment instead of embracing it.   
 There are, again, two escape routes from this conclusion.  First, one might claim that 
progressivism itself is neutral.  On the highest level of generality, progressives not only can, but must 
make this claim.  What it means to be a progressive is to believe that the progressive platform best 
advances human flourishing.  For the very reason that progressives, like everyone else, are not neutral 
with regard to their own beliefs, they are likely to believe that their own beliefs are neutral.  They are 
bound to think that adoption of their program will promote human flourishing and, therefore, that all 
sensible and humane people should favor that program.    
 But this sort of neutrality provides no basis for political union.  Even though proponents of 
particular points of view think of them as neutral, that claim alone does not provide ground to share 
with proponents of conflicting points of view.  Of course, progressives are convinced of the merits of 
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their own arguments – otherwise they would not be progressives --  but they must also acknowledge the 
brute fact that many reasonable people reject those arguments and that they do so on reasonable 
grounds.  To serve its unifying function, Constitutions must abstract from this reasonable disagreement. 
 One might think that this point is obvious but for the fact that many conservatives don’t seem to 
understand it.  They regularly defend the Constitution and a particular method of interpreting the 
Constitution as transcending political differences because, as they read it, the Constitution embodies the 
libertarian, free market principles that all reasonable people are bound to accept.90  That claim is 
plausible only if we are prepared to treat conflicting political and economic theories as illegitimate.  But 
they are not, and because they are not, the conservative argument is inconsistent with claims of 
constitutional neutrality.  And just as conservatives must come to grips with the unfortunate fact that 
there are progressives in the world, so too, progressives must recognize the existence of conservatives.  
The Constitution cannot settle our political arguments if it is read to take one side of them. 
If that is so, then all we are left with is the possibility of mystification – that is, with unjustified 
claims to neutrality that trick people into thinking that their own positions are illegitimate.  That 
possibility, in turn, leads to the second escape hatch:  Perhaps progressives should be left-Straussians.  
Perhaps the realization of progressive ends is sufficiently important to justify mystification as the means 
of achieving them.    
There are many grounds for skepticism about this conclusion, and I will only briefly rehearse 
them here.  There is little reason to think that the mystification will work or that progressives will be 
better at this game than their opponents.  On some versions of progressivism, mystification might, itself, 
                                                          
90  For a representative example, see RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION:  SECURING LIBERTY AND 
SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016). 
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be inconsistent with the progressive program.  Even if it is not, a prohibition on deliberately misleading 
our fellow citizens might be an important side constraint.   
Suppose, though, that one is unpersuaded by any of these arguments.  Even if progressives 
decide to engage in mystification, that decision does not entail an embrace of free speech.  On the 
contrary, mystification is the negation of speech freedom.  Fooling people into believing that they must 
accept a regime under which speech that they favor is systematically disadvantaged is fundamentally 
inconsistent with virtually any version of the speech right.  It subverts rather than promotes speaker 
autonomy, undermines rather than encourages a free and fair exchange of views, and denies rather 
than affirms the obligation to allow the expression of views that we hate.  In short, if progressives end 
up endorsing a mystification strategy, that will be because they have given up on freedom of speech. 
D.  Free Speech and Free Thought 
The mystification dilemma is closely related to the final argument against free speech 
progressivism:  At its root, the assertion of a constitutional right to freedom of speech is dictatorial.   
This claim will seem paradoxical to many, if not completely implausible.  On widely accepted 
accounts, free speech provides protection against dictatorship, and limitations on the speech right are 
often the first measures that dictators take when they assume control.  
 Despite all this, however, constitutionalizing the right to freedom of speech leads to an anti-
liberal mindset.  An assertion that the Constitution requires a certain state of affairs is a way of avoiding 
the necessity for producing actual reasons for why that state of affairs is desirable and just.  If the 
Constitution requires something, then that is the end of the argument, at least in American 
constitutional culture.  Short of constitutional amendment, a constitutional requirement that a thing 
must be done just means that it must be done.  Once the requirement is established, there is nothing 
left to talk about.   
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Of course, it remains open to argue that the Constitution, properly understood, does not require 
a particular state of affairs.  But making that move merely diverts discussion from the desirability and 
justice of particular outcomes to an often arcane and irrelevant dispute about constitutional 
interpretation.  We can talk until we are blue in the face about what kind of free speech regime the 
Constitution establishes.  We can disagree about the intent of the framers, the meaning of the words 
they wrote, or the extent to which the words should be read in light of our traditions and modern 
conditions.  But once constitutional meaning is established, the argument ends.  There can be no truly 
free speech about the desirability of free speech. 
This fact about contemporary constitutional culture produces another and deeper paradox:  the 
constitutional right to free speech is actually at war with free thought.  Here as elsewhere, the assertion 
of constitutional rights shuts down and sidetracks serious conversation, rather than facilitating it.  It 
provides an excuse for avoiding the first duty that citizens owe to each other:  the duty to explain and 
justify the positions that they take on questions that matter.  It provides an excuse for not speaking, for 
not listening, and for not thinking.    
Of course, none of this, by itself, demonstrates that this state of affairs harms progressives.  
There are nonetheless good reasons why the dictatorial character of constitutional argument should 
trouble them.  First, for the reasons I have already given, the free speech right tends to obstruct the 
realization of progressive objectives.  Progressives might respond to this state of affairs by attacking the 
right.  But constitutionalizing the right makes the attack pointless and, thereby, further weakens the 
political position of progressives. 
The second reason is more speculative but also more powerful.  Many progressives would like to 
believe that they could convince others if only they had a fair chance to do so.  They think that their 
position would be endorsed by people who participated in a robust, unfettered and equal dialogue 
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about what is necessary for human flourishing.  Thought, reason, and imagination, unlocked by 
unconstrained discussion and unpolluted by prejudice and preconception, just leads to progressive 
views. 
A belief of this sort may underestimate differences in culture, perception, values and 
experience.  It may result from arrogance about the rightness of one’s own position.  For reasons I have 
already given, it almost certainly reflects a naïve view about the likely effects of a speech right in our 
current circumstances.   
Still, something like this belief provides an explanation for why many progressives cling to a 
belief in freedom of speech.  And, suppose that, despite all the reasons for skepticism, progressives are 
right to be optimistic about the outcome of unfettered speech.  That very optimism should make them 
hesitate to invoke constitutional free speech claims which, themselves, obstruct the very unconstrained 
dialogue that they favor.   
IV. Conclusion 
“Civil liberties once were radical.”  That’s how Laura Weinrib begins her magnificent book about 
the dramatic transformation of free speech ideology during the interwar period.91  But those were in the 
days when free speech advocates embraced rights “’prior to and independent of constitutions,’ secured 
without recourse to law.”92  Groups like the American Civil Liberties Union managed to translate this 
right of agitation into the language of law, but the radicalism of free speech got lost in the translation.  
As Weinrib explains 
By the early 1940s, civil liberties were no longer radical.  . . .  The ACLU had naively hoped, in an 
era when revolution seemed possible, that a mere right to agitate would pave the way to 
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substantive change.  Implicit in their position was the confidence that radicalism would prevail 
in the marketplace of ideas.  By the 1940s, employers understood that no free exchange of ideas 
existed.  They understood that a right to free speech would ordinarily favor those with superior 
resources.93 
These were lessons learned long ago.  And yet, many modern progressives seem to have 
forgotten them.  They just can’t shake their mindless attraction to the bright flame of our free speech 
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